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This paper anaIyzes the costs and benefits of using a Main Bank (MB) as a financial provider.
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other participants. These inside banks act as fund providers for the project, exchanging roles by
 
the time other projects are considered. We showhow, depending on firms quality and the banks
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we believe sorne of its features have the potential to be implemented in other marketplaces.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been quite a number of papers and several books dealing 
with the economic analysis and importance of the Japanese corporate groups 
(CG), like the keiretsu or kigyo shudan. In contrast to this, the economic features 
behind the notion of the Main Bank (MB) are not so well known and developed, 
even though this institution seems to playa pivotal role in the success or failure 
of the industrial group. Economists working in this area, are particularly keen in 
the search of explanations and the economic logic behind this institution. j 
These two institutions, MB and CG, represent corporate arrangements de­
signed to mitigate informational and incentive problems. In his analysis of cor­
porate grouping in Japan, Hoshi (1994) describes 3 major features linked to the 
financial services that characterize those groups: (i) members of the group provide 
debt financing, (ii) hold shares and (iii) supply board members. Aoki (1994b), 
following a similar approach, describe the MB as a system consisting in a nexus 
of main bank-firm relationships, reciprocal monitoring delegation arrangements 
among main banks, and linkages between the financial authorities and the bank­
ing industry. In our approach we only cover the first two points. We agree the 
third factor may facilitate the success of the MB arrangement, but, nevertheless, 
we think a good understanding of the first two elements captures the core issues 
of this institutional arrangement. 
Certainly Hoshi's three features can also be found outside Japanese groups. For 
instance, if we turn our attention to other forms of bank-firm relationships, we see 
that the German hausebank , the Korean chaebol or sorne of the Spanish indus­
trial groups (Corporación Industrial Banesto, BBV, Cooperatives in Mondragón) 
provide alternative examples in line with those features Hoshi describes. 
The MB system, however, proves itself quite different from the financial arrange­
ments present in other bank-oriented systems. Under this system, firms and 
financial intermediaries are tied through a cross-relationship that goes beyond 
the simple provision of funds: they exchange valuable information concerning the 
different markets where they are presento 
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Although, and in line with its importance, there is a growing number of eco­
nornic papers approaching the main bank issue, we still lack a widely accepted 
definition of what a main bank means. Moreover, different authors emphasized 
different aspects of the relation as the key elements. They aH agree in one thing 
though, a Main Eank Contract (MEC) is not a legal or formal contract, neither 
an explicit one. We are dealing here with informal contracts, sustained· through 
reputational effects, and where institutions play a crucial role in terms of facili­
tating the achievement of better solutions. In such a context, our first goal will 
be to establish what we understand by a MEe. To do so, we use the framework 
developed by Sheard and Aoki, presenting a relatively simple model that captures, 
in our opinion, sorne key elements of the ME, not covered before in the economic 
literature. Unlike Sheard (1994b) we explicitly model a firmo This aHows us to ask 
questions about the optimally of the MEC under different types of firm's charac­
teristics. Another important difference is that he views the MEC as a delegated 
monitoring mechanism and compares it with a so-called normal contract where 
each bank monitors different firms, in a non-cooperative basis (therefore getting 
involved in redundant tasks). Sheard concludes that the first contract is superior 
to this second one. In our approach, we compare the MEC with different types of 
contracts that are initially superior to the competitive monitoring used by Sheard 
as a benchmark. Gn the other hand, Aoki (1994a) emphasizes the analysis of the 
firm neglecting, in contrast to our analysis, the possible cross-type relationships 
existent among financial suppliers. 
More specifically, we make use of the following characteristics to build up our 
MEC model: 
1/ Reciprocal monitoring among banks. That is, we need several relationships 
to justify that a bank may play the role of a ME in sorne occasions while in others 
this same bank performs a secondary role and free-rides on another ME. 
2/ A ME bears all the responsibility in front of the other bank participants. 
But it becomes the residual claimant in case of financial distress. 
3/ The role of a ME as monitor does not correspond to its share of ownership 
or lending share. 
Certainly, with the choice of these elements to develop a formal model we 
miss sorne of the previously mentioned features but we consider our approach as 
one more in the process of achieving a better understanding of this important 
economic institution. 
In this setting, our main objective will be to prove, that a MEC can be, when 
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certain conditions are met, an optimal financial arrangement to provide funds and 
monitoring to the maximum number of projects. We identify these conditions in 
a context where the transfer of sorne expertise to the firm turns out to be as 
important as the provision of funds to develop a project. We can expect that new 
industrial sectors or economies in the early stages of development (Japan in the 
60's, or Korea in the 70's) are the natural framework to extensively find this kind 
of projects to develop. With that goal in mind, we compare the MBC with four 
alternative contractsj the so-caHed Exclusive Bank Contract, the Syndicated Bank 
Contract, the Cooperative Bank Contract and finaHy, the previously mentioned, 
Normal Contracto In aH cases the required threshold quality level to finance 
a project, turns to be higher than the social optimum one. That is, we face an 
underinvestment situation in aH scenarios. Nevertheless the MBC achieves, under 
sorne specific requirements, the lowest threshold. The intuitive explanation is that 
the MBC combines in an optimal way three features: 1/ An exclusive allocation 
of the financier's property rights to one of the banks (the Main Bank). 2/ An 
incentive scheme that stimulates the MB to carry out an intensive monitoring 
because of its junior rights in case of failure. 3/ The acquisition of informational 
spillovers. It is important to note that the specific conditions needed to achieve 
these superior results for the MBC, are not extraordinary, contrary to what one 
could think concerning the questionable validity of the MB system in our days. 
We think the key feature becomes to know whether the MB really bears the cost of 
a project failure or noto As a conglomerate financed through a MB system grows, 
and becomes larger, the state cannot afford its failure (too-big-to-fail). Within 
this logic the state ends up becoming the real bearer of the risks assumed by the 
firms within these conglomerates. This feature becomes, as the recent setback in 
South Korea shows, very perverse due to the lack of incentives the MB has to 
implement efficient monitoring actions. 
This paper is organized in four sections. The hypothesis of the model are 
placed in Section 2 while the solution and the main results foHow in Section 3. 
Sorne discussion and a preliminary empirical evidence is presented in Section 4. 
The paper ends with sorne concluding remarks. For convenience the mathematical 
proofs have placed in an appendix. 
6 A Main Bank Approach to Financia] Contracting 
2. THE MODEL 
We proceed now to design a simple framework that deals with the previously 
mentioned featl,lI'es, and issues of the MB. We first describe the nature and actions 
of the agents. Later, we characterize the different financial contracts and the 
timing of the game. 
We consider a two-period model with three basic elements: banks, firms and the 
financial contract which links them. We proceed to describe them separately. 
Al Banks 
Financial institutions face two tasks in this model: i/ they lend funds to firms 
so that they can undertake a two-period project, and ii/ they monitor the devel­
opment of projects. The intensity of this task is given by the variable y, where 
O :::; y :::; 1, chosen at the beginning of the initial period before the entrepreneur 
define his own actions. Behind the term "monitoring" , we synthesize diverse activ­
ities such as supervision, advisory, knowledge transfer and in general the different 
types of support actions taken by the lender to achieve an optimal behavior from 
the entrepreneur. Under this model characterization, such actions are essential to 
achieve the whole development of the project. That is, we consider that a project 
has sorne "potential" quality (), that can only be reached if a perfect monitoring 
(y = 1) is implemented. Whenever the monitoring is imperfect, y < 1, then, the 
"working" quality of the project turns out to be ()y < (). We assume that all banks 
have access to the same monitoring technology which is given, for convenience, 
by a quadratic cost function !my2 l. Furthermore, we consider !m :::; 1, with 
1 being the required amount to develop the project. Assuming this, we neglect 
the situation where the perfect monitoring cost, (!m), would be higher than the 
overall funds lent by the bank, situation quite unrealistic. 
Finally, the rights and duties of each bank, depend on the type of financial 
contract linking a firm with the bank, as we describe later in the paper. 
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BI Firms 
We consider two symmetric firms working in different markets. Each firm 
wants to develop a two-period project. The previously referred potential project 
quality, B, is publicly known and works in the same way for both firms. The 
development of a project requires a layout 1, where we normalize without loss of 
generality, 1 = 2 2 (obviously with this convention, the previous !m ::; Ihypoth­
esis becomes m ::; 4). Firms lack financial resources and must arrange a loan of 
1 = 2 . Firms lack financial resources and must arrange a loan of 1 = 2 3, with 
one or several banks to develop a project. 
Our firm is an entrepreneurial one, and becomes characterized by its entrepre­
neur's effort, h (O ::; h ::; 1). In fact, we abstract from the control issue at this 
level, and we do not distinguish among the different agents inside the firmo In our 
model, the entrepreneur selects his effort, h, at the end of the first period, and 
this choice affects the second-period results. The motivation behind this approach 
can be explained in the fol1owing terms. 
1/ "Entrepreneur's effort", h, can be seen as a synthesis of the different ef­
forts present inside the firmo Basical1y, we consider h to be a training effort to 
implement the expertise transfer by the lender through its monitoring activity, y. 
2/ Efforts inside the firm are chosen by the end of the first period, before the 
state of nature has revealed to be good or bad, and, after the financial institutions 
have implemented their monitoring actions, y. The entrepreneur perceives the 
level of lender's engagement through the variable y, which, remember, determines 
the "real" quality of the project, By. FUrthermore, this expression, defines the 
ex-ante probability the project to be in the good state. Once the entrepreneur 
observes this, he acts accordingly to his own interest. 
3/ The entrepreneur's choice comes into effect in the second period, once the 
state of the project is revealed. 
4/ During the initial period, the lender performs its actions to improve the 
external conditions that help the project to be in a good state of nature. Accord­
ing to this approach, an entrepreneur cannot affect these external conditions, and 
his effort circumscribes to the iniemal domain of the firmo Only after the state 
of nature is revealed, the project will be isolated from external conditions. This 
happens in the second period, and it is then, when the action of the entrepreneur 
plays its role, conditioning the final returns of the project. If the project reveals 
itself as good, we assume that firm's technology leads to a second-period pro­
duction X with a probability, h, given by the entrepreneur effort. On the other 
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hand, if the bad state is realized, the expected returns of the project will be zero, 
independently of h. Furthermore, we assume a liquidation value equal to zero, as 
there is no returns at the end of the initial period 4. 
Additionally, we consider entrepreneur's effort to be observable but not veri­
fiable and, therefore, not contractible ex-ante. Finally, as we have pointed effort 
h is costly and its disutility is given by a function C = ~lh2. F'urthermore, we 
assume that all the entrepreneurs, characterized by the parameter l, are of the 
same type, independently of the market in which they operate. 
C / Financial Contracts 
A financial contract is a vector {/, /1}, where / = 2 is the referred amount 
of funds to develop the project, and /1 is the firm's share on the returns. F'unds 
are supplied at the beginning of period one, but the partition of funds (/1, 1 - J-L) 
is made at the beginning of period two, once the state of the nature has been 
revealed. At this stage, lenders can liquidate the project or not, and a negotiation 
between the entrepreneur and the lenders starts. The outcome of this process 
is a definition of a /1 value that will depend on the type of financial contract 
considered. We distinguish five different scenarios, depending on the existing links 
among fund providers: Exclusive Bank Contract (EBC), Main Bank Contract, 
Syndicated Bank Contract (SBC), Cooperative Bank Contract (CBC), Normal 
Contract (NC). 
For the first contract, EBC, we understand a scenario where each firm's project 
is financed by a particular financial supplier. For the second scenario, the MBC, 
we assume the following: 
1/ There are two lenders working for each single firmo One of them acts as 
a MB and lends an amount / = 2 to the firm, while borrows from a second bank 
(SB) , a share (1 - a) of the total mount. This initial MB behaves as a second 
bank in an other project. 
2/ The SB behaves as a senior lender, and receives a share (1 - a) of the 
project's revenues whenever the return is high enough (that is ~ 2(1- a)). /f not, 
the amount of revenues received will be as close as possible to the quantity lento 
3/ Finally, the MB is responsible for monitoring tasks, and pays for its costs. 
It is important to note that this cross-relationship, allows to obtain a coop­
erative solution between banks within a non-cooperative approach. If a SB tried 
to exploit the benefit of its situation in one market, its corresponding MB could 
retaliate in the other market where the deviant acts as a MB. This feature pre­
vents the firm to negotiate directly with its SB to diminish the bargaining power 
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ofthe MB. 
The three remaining contracts are intermediate cases of these two extreme 
forms. Thus, in the syndicated loan (SBC), each bank is responsible for mon­
itoring one project, becoming a leading bank (=LB) for this project. The LB 
bears aH the monitoring costs a la Main Bank, but differs from this, because its 
claims are not junior to other lenders' claims. The fourth type is the Cooperative 
Contract (CBC), where two (or more) institutions cooperate, sharing aH the risks 
and costs in the same proportion of their respective investments' share, a and 
1 - a. FinaHy, the normal contract (NC), is the benchmark described in Sheard 
(1994b). In this financial relationship each creditor defines its monitoring inten­
sity in a non-cooperative basis. This feature, which makes this contract radically 
different from the previous four ones, willlead to the most inefficient situation in 
this approach. 
The foHowing figure captures the different scenarios described aboye. 
2/MBC ISBClIEBC 
Ay QB AG.:U B 1-0: 11 11 
a aOh OhO O 
3/CBC 4/NC 
A B A B 
1-0: 
lo: 0:1 lo: J}I 
aO Oh aO Oh 
To end this section, we summarize the structure of the game 
- .... __.. _-------------------------------------­
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Timing oí the Game 
The sequence of actions and events of this game can be described as follows: 
1st period period 
1 ( 
1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 
1/ Facing a 2-period project with a "potential" quality e, banks provide 
1 = 2 funds to a firm through a 8T contracto 
2/ A particular bank implements a monitoring effort y. This determines, 
jointly with e, the state of nature, good or bad, in our terminology. 
3/ After observing y, the entrepreneur selects an effort level, h. 
4/ At the end of the first period the project reveals itself as good or bad 
contingent with y and e. In abad state the game ends. 
5/ In the second period, and if the project is in the good state, a
 
negotiation between the entrepreneur and the banks starts to
 
define how the returns will be shared, /1- and 1 - /1-)'
 
6/ The final returns, X, follow with sorne probability given by entrepreneur's 
effort, h . Later, this outcome is shared with the proportions /1- and 1 - /1-. 
3. SOLVING THE MODELS 
We proceed now to solve the model and in order to compare the different financial 
relationships, we obtain the first-best solution to be considered as a benchmark. 
3.1. FIRST-BEST SOLUTION 
We define the threshold quality level, eFB , that determines which projects get 
funds in a first-best scenario will be financed. The social utility function UFB , 
becomes the following: 
FB 1 2 1 2MaX{y,h}U =eyhX - 2 - "2lh - "2my (1) 
This first-best solution is characterized by the fact that all agents' actions can 
be verifiable. Therefore, the ex-ante financing policy can be made simultaneously 
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This first-best solution is characterized by the fact that aH agents' actions can 
be verifiable. Therefore, the ex-ante financing policy can be made simultaneously 
contingent to y and h. This fact is what makes the first-best solution superior to 
other situation considered where the entrepreneur's effort, h, is not contractible 
ex-ante. 
Solving the problem, we find two cases, depending on the value l - m 1 beingI 
higher or lower than four 5. 
i{2+ Hm+l)} Jf Il-m I~ 4 (2) 
eFB = {
. iJq(4+g) Jf Il-m 1> 4 (3) 
Where 9. = Min{l, m} and q = Max{l, m} 
Direct inspection of the previous expressions reveals that, for small differences 
between l and m, both parameters will contribute with the same weight to eFB . 
This is not so surprising, given the symmetric nature of the first-best problem, 
where there is a simultaneous choice of efforts. Moreover, each agent implements 
the highest possible effort (y = 1 and h = 1). This outcome changes radically 
when agents' quality becomes quite different (Il - m I~ 4) 6 • In this case, only 
the high-quality agent implements the maximum effort, eH = 1, while the low­
quality agent free-rides on the other agent, shrinking his effort to a level eL = e~. q 
Furthermore, as equation (3) shows, the low effort implemented by the bad-quality
 
agent has an amplified negative impact in the project's returns, due to the mul­

tiplicative functional form of eFB . In other words, this is a way to show the
 
inconvenience to couple agents with quite different qualities in these scenarios, as
 
the low-quality agent free-rides on the other agent.
 
After presenting the first-best approach, we proceed to develop the different con­

tracts in detai1.
 
--.-_._------._---------------------------------­
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3.2. EXCLUSIVE BANKING CONTRACT 
Here there is a cooperative arrangement between banks, and we assume each bank 
establishes an exclusive relationship with one of the firms considered. 
As usual, we solve the game in a backward induction fashion, characterizing 
first the entrepreneur's problem. 
In this scenario, the entrepreneur implements rus effort decision, h, once the lender 
has defined, and the entrepreneur has observed, the monitoring intensity y. There­
fore his goal will be to select a value h = h[y] that solves the following maximiza­
tion problem: 
MaX{h} UEnt 
UEntS.t. > 
Where Ji-EB denotes the income share he is entitled to, and 1- Ji-EB is the lender's 
bargaining power. To determine Ji-EB, we have to keep in mind that it is defined 
at the beginning of period two. At that time, independently of the state of the 
nature, the lender has the power to liquidate the project and obtain a null rent 
(as L = O). On the other hand, the entrepreneur can withdraw from the firm, and 
block any return (as h defines the second-period probability of project returns). 
Both facts make certain that a sequential bargaining between both agents will 
lead to Ji-EB = 1 - Ji-EB = ~. Each agent has the same bargaining power, as its 
participation in the project is required to generate sorne returns. 
Once we have characterized the entrepreneur's effort policy, we use this value 
and see how the financial institution chooses its monitoring intensity, y, solving: 
EB) 1 2Max{y} UEB (1 - Ji- ()yhX - -my - 2 2 
UEBS.t. > O, O :s; Y :s; 1 and h = h[y] (5) 
Through the analysis of the different scenarios, it proves quite useful to make use 
of a corrected value of entrepreneur's effort disutility. By L = l (1:¡.t) we denote 
the "effective" entrepreneur's effort disutility. That is, we defiate l by the ratio 
of firm's bargaining power Ji- to the lender's bargaining power (1 - Ji-). When 
this ratio becomes high, the entrepreneur has more incentives than the lender to 
pursue the success of the project. Therefore, L, is the parameter that describes 
the entrepreneur's willingness to implement efforts 7. Consequently, this becomes 
the "natural" measure to be compared with the m parameter which describes the 
lender willingness to implement monitoring actions. 
13 A Main Bank Approach to Financia] Contracting 
Point 2/ in the Appendix shows how to calculate the corresponding threshold­
value eE: 
eE = ~Jm;4Max{m;4,L} (6) 
This expression contains two factors. The first factor, only depends on m, and 
it is a direct consequence of the sequential ordering of the game. The financial 
institution implements first its monitoring-incentive effort y, an consequently, an 
m-dependent factor has to be presento This is so, independently of the "effective" 
entrepreneur's effort disutility (L) 8. The second factor balances the monitor's 
quality, with that of the entrepreneur, being L-dependent when L > mt4 • 
Finally and similarly to the first-best solution, both agents implement the maxi­
mum effort (y = h = 1), when we consider an entrepreneur with enough "effective" 
quality. That is L < mr. 
The comparison of e E with the first-best solution e FB , will allow us to de­
fine which combinations of agents' expertise will reduce the shortage in project 
financing. 
PROPOSITION 1 
We obtain an underinvestment outcome when we compare the EBC with the 
> eFBfirst-best solution; that is eE . This underinvestment becomes larger if 
the agent who chooses first (the monitoring-lender) is of lower quality than the 
entrepreneur (m > L). 
Proof 
See the third point in the Appendix. 
The level of underinvestment is a natural consequence of our hypothesis of con­

sidering effort h observable but not verifiable. It is no longer possible to write
 
complete contracts contingent with h.
 
Furthermore, we observe an increase in the underinvestment problem when an
 
agent with lower quality makes the first decision (lender). In such situation
 
(L ~ mt4 ), the eE threshold depends only on m. That is different to the so­

cial optimum solution, where the simultaneous choice of y and h lead to a eFB
 
that balanced l and m. In fact, monitoring intensity in the perfect information
 
framework is yFB = 1, but under the EB arrangement, for L < m, then monitor­

ing is far from perfect, yEB < 1.
 
We proceed now to analyze if we can improve these EBC results through the 
use of a main bank, that is, dealing with the MBC. 
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3.3. MAIN BANK CONTRACT 
As it was defined in Section 2, our notion of Main Bank Contract (MBC) follows 
the description of Sheard (1994b). Thus, we denote with MB i the Main Bank for 
project i. This bank provides a proportion a of the necessary funds to finance 
project i 9 and exchanges·1 - a with the other bank in order to finance the 
other project. Recall we consider only two banks in this economy to simplify 
matters. We assume this (1 - a) financing of a project which is placed in a 
different market, allows the bank to acquire some informational spillovers, while 
diversifying its investment at the same time. This information is provided by the 
other Main Bank in exchange for the inside information of its own monitored firmo 
In fact, in countries like Japan, these meetings where lenders exchange vahiable 
information are quite common and institutionalized. Industries may be different, 
but they may have some common areas of interests from which the lender may 
learn or have access to valuable information. 
At the time of analyzing possible reductions in the underinvestment problem 
through the use of the MBC, we note the presence of two different effects. First, 
there is a direct incentive effect, linked to the junior nature of the MB claims 
as opposed to the second bank (SB) in case of a project failure. To avoid this 
unfavorable situation, the MB will monitor more intensively. Besides, there is 
also a spillover effect, linked to the fact that MB i 10 can enjoy some advantages 
acting as a SB_ i in the other market. The additional value MB i obtains from 
informational spillovers is modeled by multiplying by a factor >. ~ 1 the rents 
MBi obtains as SB_i ; that is, >'U~f ll. At the end, this additional informational 
rents will help to diminish the underinvestment problem of MBio 
In a similar way as we did in the EBC scenario, we can solve the game back­
wards. First, we have to consider the entrepreneur's maximization problem, which 
is formally identical to equation (4) but, modifying the sharing of project returns 
between the entrepreneur and the lender in the adequate way, that is ¡.lEB -+ ¡.lMB. 
The key point here is that the bargaining between the entrepreneur and the lender 
under this MBC becomes symmetric to what we found in the EBC. This is so 
because each firm only negotiates with its corresponding MB as it happen in an 
exclusive bank. There is no contact between the SB and the firms. Within such 
as scheme we can also ensure that ¡.lMB = !. 
The resolution of the entrepreneur's problem leads to an expression of h as a 
function of y of the form h = h[y] = Min{¡.LM~(JXY, 1}. 
The next stage is to solve the MB problem. Without loss of generality, we focus 
on Project 1, due to the symmetry of the problem. Using the h[y] expression of 
-------------------------------------------
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entrepreneur's effort, and keeping in mind what we have stated about informa­
tional spillovers, the objective function for MB I to define the monitoring intensity 
YI is given by: 
1 2 SBM aX{yd uttB - 7r YI - 2mYI + )..U2[] [Y2]} 
UMB >s..t I Oand h = h[y] 
Where 7r[Y] denotes the revenues obtained by the MB from the monitored project
 
once a monitoring intensity y is implemented and h = h[y].
 
U;B[Y2] are the returns MBI obtains from project 2, once MB2implements y = Y2
 
and h = h [y]. Those two expressions become:
 
a(R[YI]-2) 11 YI?:'y (1- a)(R[Y2) - 2) 11 Y2 ?:. Y 
USB ­2 - O 11 u ~ Y2 < y (8) 
-2a 11 YI < U R[Y2] - 2(1- a) 11 Y2 < U 
R[Yi] = (1 - /l)()Xyh R[y) = 2 R[U] = 2(1 - a) 
To characterize this problem, we define y as the monitoring level for which 
the project returns are large enough to allow the junior c1aimant (Le. MB) to 
recover its initial investment, 2a. Whenever y ~ y < y, only the senior c1aimant 
(Le. SB), can get back its initial investment 2(1- a) completely. Finally, for low 
levels of monitoring (y < U), all the returns will be kept by the SB. Moreover, this 
amount is not enough to recover its initial spending. 
In Point 4 of the Appendix, we compute the corresponding ()M values. We first 
focus in the situation where the informational spillovers have no value; that is, 
).. = 1. Obviously, this is the least favorable framework for the MBC in comparison 
with other financial arrangements. The MBC investment outcome obtained under 
this assumption represents therefore the lower bound. 
We can distinguish three different situations, considering the proportion of 
funds a provided by the MB! to finance the project 1: 
Case 1: High involvement in the financing of project 1. 
When a is high enough, more specifically when a ?:. a[m) = ~~4 ' then the MBC 
threshold-value, ()M, coincides with the one obtained under the EBC. 
Furthermore, the threshold value a[m) is increasing in m and, therefore, as mon­
itoring expertise rises, MB I can reduce its participation in project 1 financing 
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without losing efficiency with regard to the EBC. We suggest, that in a risk­
averse framework, any reduction in the level of a will represent a risk-reduction 
strategy for a MB. This is so because it basically performs a role as a SB, hedged 
by the other MB. 
Case 2: Medium involvement in project 1. 
This situation corresponds to values of a in the region !a[m] ::;.. a < a[m] . We 
differentiate the study according to the value of L 12 
For L > mr, ()M coincides, as in the previous case, with the threshold value 
of the EBC, ()E. It is interesting to point out that the mi4 value is the total 
cost (financing and monitoring costs 13) born by each lender. In the Appendix, 
we show that as long as the "effective" entrepreneur effort disutility, L, be higher 
than the former cost, the entrepreneur could implement an "imperfect" effort 
h = J(m:4)/2 < 1. This fact, as we are going to see later, is common to all finan­
cial arrangements, and enhances a perfect monitoring behavior from the financial 
institution, to minimize the returns lost due to this entrepreneur behavior. 
Regarding the L < mi4 region, we obtain an underinvestment situation indepen­
dently of the L value (see point 5 in the Appendix). In particular: 
~~J(2~0) Jf L < (2~0) 
()M = (9) 
{ 2 !!Ji L Jf _4_ < L < m+4X V-;- v2L-4 (2-0) - 2 
Case 3: Low engagement in project 1 financing 
When a < ~a[m] ,there is an underinvestment independently of L. The threshold 
values are the same as the previous case, but for a low-quality entrepreneur 
(L > _2_) 14 ()M = 'O > ()E 
- (1-0)' .¡a
The reason for this overall underinvestment is linked to the low level of involvement 
of the MB in its project financing. This fact, leads the MB to implement an 
imperfect monitoring effort y < 1, differently to case 2/ where there is a perfect 
monitoring for a high L entrepreneur (L > mi4 ). Eventually, this fact implies a 
rise in the threshold-value, ()M, with regard to other situations considered. 
Before analyzing the previous results in more detail, we synthesize them in the 
following Proposition, making a comparison with the EBC: 
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PROPOSITION 2 
Assuming no valuefor the informational spillovers (i.e., ..\ = 1), the MBC can 
mimic the EBC, that is ()E = ()M, in the following situations: 
1/ When MBi finances project i with a share a ;?: a[m] = ~~4 
2/ Jf ka[m] ~ a < a[m] and the entrepreneur is of bad quality L > mt4 
Jf we assume the presence of spillovers (i.e., ..\ > 1), a reduction of the un­
derinvestment, that is ()M[..\ > 1] < ()E is obtained for those situations such that 
eE = eM [..\ = 1] 
Proof 
See point 5 in the Appendix 
When the entrepreneur is a low-quality one, we have shown that we do not need the 
MB to finance the monitored project with a large share to obtain the same result 
as through the EBC. Dnder both financial schemes, the finallender carries out a 
perfect monitoring (y = 1), in order to provide incentives to the entrepreneur to 
display a large effort intensity h. We call this the incentive effect 15. On the other 
hand, for a high-quality entrepreneur (a low L in our terminology), the incentive 
effect becomes less important. This is so, because the latter agent implements 
the maximum effort h = 1 without requiring a previous perfect monitoring y = 1 
from the lender 16. Therefore, the MB chooses its effort, y, weighting only its 
a-share in the financing of the monitored project. As in the MBC, a ~ 1, a 
lower level of monitoring than in the EBC is obtained, and consequently a higher 
threshold-value follows. 
As a final consideration, we know the use of linear utility functions prevents 
a systematic study of risk. Nevertheless, the fact that the EBC results can be 
obtained through a MBC arrangement, with a lower involvement in the monitored 
project (Q < 1), allows us to suggest for the case of risk-averse lenders and even 
if informational spillovers have no value (i.e., ..\ = 1), the MBC would be superior 
to the EBC in those situations where eM = ()E of Proposition 2. Once we consider 
spillover considerations, the previous result is reinforced. 
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3.4. SYNDICATED BANK CONTRACT 
This financial arrangement as Horiuchi (1994) points out, is quite similar to the 
MBC. There is a "leading b~1Ilk" (=LB), which has a role much like the position 
of the main bank in a MBC arrangement. The difference is, that although both 
banks perform an ex-ante and interim monitoring (how the loan is used), a LB 
is not expected to be involved in any rescue operation ("ex-post" monitoring in 
Aoki's words). Therefore, only the MB does all three types of monitoring. for­
malize this difference, rather than focusing on rescue actions, which are out of our 
approach, we consider the LB has no junior claims with regard to other lenders in 
case of shortages in the project returns. In fact we see this feature as an expres­
sion of the lower LB's commitment towards a firm in a loan syndication. Apart 
from convenient, this assumption seems to be quite realistic in a loan syndication 
contexto 
To facilitate the comparisons between both financial contracts, we assume 
that each monitoring bank lends an a:-share of the credit amount to its respective 
monitored project and 1 - a: to the other project. 
The resolution of the game follows the same pattern as before. The en­
trepreneur problem is given by expression (4), obtaining the previously found 
h[y] = Min{¡.LsBtXY , 1}. The /lSB parameter, defined as the entrepreneur's share 
in the bargaining process between the lender and the entrepreneur, is absolutely 
identical to the MBC situation. That is /lSB = /lMB = ~. Gn the other hand, the 
LB's maximization problem (focusing in project 1, and considering that informa­
tion spillovers have no value) becomes: 
M aX{yilULB _ a:[R[Yl] - 2] - ~m(Yl)2 + (1 - a:)[R[Y2] - 2] 
s.t. Yl > O h = h[y], ULB 2: O (11) 
The results of both maximization problems and the comparison to the threshold­
value obtained under the MBC scheme, (jM, are summarized in the following 
Proposition: 
~~~~~------."._-----------------------------._----­
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PROPOSITION 3 
Assuming that information spillovers are of no value (A = 1), the investment 
policy carried out by lenders under a MBC and a SBC is given by the following 
facts: 
1/ The MBC mimics the SBC, whenever a ~ ~a[m] 
2/ For a small loan share by each monitoring bank (a < ~a[m]), when the 
entrepreneur is a high quality one, L < (l~a)' we obtain a lower underinvest­
ment situation under the SBC than the MBC; that is, eM< eS. Otherwise both 
threshold-values coincide. 
Proof: 
See point 7 in the Appendix. 
To understand this result, we have to stress that the monitoring policy is linked 
to two effects (if we neglect spillovers considerations): 
1/ An incentive effect, previously explained, through which the monitor tries 
to provide incentives to the entrepreneur in order to implement higher effort levels. 
The higher the monitoring activities of the lender be, the higher the probability 
to reach the good state of nature, and the higher the incentives to acquire sorne 
specific knowledge by the entrepreneur are. This is so because this specific exper­
tise has sorne value only in the good state of nature when it can generate potential 
rents in the second-period. 
2/ A financing effeet, related to the higher monitoring willingness once (the 
monitoring bank) has invested heavily in a project. This effect, is closely related 
with the specific contractual arrangements among fund providers concerning their 
sharing of rights and duties. 
Our point is that the first effect becomes, in the case of a high-quality entre­
preneur, irrelevant. This is so because the latter agent implements, by its proper 
nature, the maximum effort h = 1, without requiring the monitoring bank to give 
any incentive. As the share of the funds provided by both monitoring banks in a 
project becomes small (a < ~a[m]), then, the second effect lowers as well. The 
distinction between the MBC and the SBC, comes from the fact that each MB 
is also a secondary bank (SB) which is hedged by the other bank, as it concedes 
senior rights over returns. This is not maintained by the LB in the SBC. If a is 
low, the role as SBs of all the MBs rises (1 - a high), generating a decrease in 
their incentives to monitor efficientIy, due to each MB has senior rights over its 
main share of funds lent (1 - a)l. 
------------._-------------------------_._-­
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As a final remark, we want to stress that the SBC can be, once we ignore 
spillovers considerations, an arrangement as good as the MBC. This is specially 
relevant once we introduce sorne risk-aversion in the lender's utility function. In 
that case, the lower the involvement required by the monitoring bank (a) be, 
the lower the risk it bears will be. We have shown that for high-quality lenders, 
the lowest involvement of the LB defines the situation where the SBC is strictly 
superior to the MBC. Making use of this result, we can argue that in a risk-averse 
framework, risk considerations will make the SBC even better compared to the 
MBC. 
3.5. COOPERATIVE CONTRACT SOLUTION 
As a matter of completeness, we consider a last "cooperative" contract, which 
consists of two banks, "horizontally" linked providing funds with proportion a 
and 1- a . More specifically, bank 1lends a share a of funds to finance project 1, 
and 1-ato finance project 2, and the opposite for bank 2. Regarding monitoring 
tasks, each bank has the responsibility to monitor one project, but the cost to do 
so as well as the profits generated, are shared consistently with each of the banks 
financing shares. This feature is different to the SBC and the MBC, where the 
"monitoring bank", (the LB in the former contract, and the MB in the latter), 
Was obliged to assume entirely the monitoring costs. 
To fully characterize this contract resolution, we follow the same steps as 
before. First, we solve the entrepreneur problem which is equivalent to the one 
seen in (4). Second, we maximize lender l's utility function, which is symmetric 
to lender 2's. The problem, focusing again in the situation where information 
spillovers have no value, is given by: 
Max{yIlaR1 [Yl] + (1- a)R2[Y2] - ~m(Yl)2 - (1;a)myi - 2 
Our hypothesis concerning project's common nature and the way banks share 
their rights and responsibilities in this CBC, makes this financial relationship 
equivalent to the EBC (a-independent results). Moreover, when we consider 
spillover rents (>. > 1), this financial arrangement is superior to the EBC, and 
at least as good as the MBC. The analysis of the firm's bargaining power j.L, will 
allow us to differentiate the CBC from the MBC. We are going to argue that 
under the CBC, j.L = ~, unlike the previous scenarios where j.L = ~. To obtain 
this result, we have to characterize the disagreement situation in the sequential 
game between the three agents (both lenders and the firm). To do so, we consider 
that each lender has the power to liquidate the project (Le., end the game) even 
.............__.__._---------------------------­
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if the other lender does not want too This assumption prevents the fum from 
forcing competition between lenders (this will be considered in the next scenario), 
and ensures all agents to have the same power. That is J-L = i, because the 
commitment of each of them is a necessary condition to generate value. Each 
lender can interrupt the project if they want, while the entrepreneur can make the 
project of no value by not participating in the second periodo The distinction in J-L 
under both financing scenarios is relevant because the threshold-values obtained 
are inversely related with J-L(1 - J-L), which is maximum when J-L = ~. Thus, for a 
given J-L, whenever the threshold values under the CBC and the MBC coincide 17, 
that is OC[J-L] = OE[J-L] = OM[J-L] , we can ensure a lower underinvestment under a 
MBC than under a CBC (OM[J-LM] < OC[J-LC]) 
With respect to an overall comparison of the three types of financial arrange­
ment studied, we can word the following Proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4 
The MBC approach is at least as good as the EBC, the SBC, and the CBC ap­
proaches, if the informational spillovers have some value (A > 1) and the monitor­
ing bank participates in the monitored project financing with a share high enough 
(a 2: a[m] =~~4)' 
In case of a low involvement of the monitoring bank in the project (a low), the 
SBC is superior to the MBC. 
Proof: 
By Propositions 1, 2 and 3. 
The intuition behind the superiority under the conditions defined of the MBC over 
the previous financial arrangements is that this financial arrangement combines 
in an optimal way three features previously referred: (i) an incentive effect, (ii) a 
financing effect, and (iii) the existence of sorne value in the information transferred 
from one project to the other. 
More specifically, as we have outlined in Proposition 2, the MBC is superior 
to the EBC if (a) the monitoring bank's loan share is high enough or (b) when 
the entrepreneur's quality is low. We must notice the importance of the lender's 
market-structure effect in the MBC approach. This is related, as we previously 
described in the MBC characterization, to the existence of two incentives in the 
lender's actions. First, there exist a heavy penalty for the MB when the project 
becomes unsuccessful. Second, there exist valuable informational spillovers avail­
able to the MB, when it plays as a SB in the other project. Keeping these facts 
in mind, we can argue this financial contract outperforms the EBC whenever the 
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other two effects are not "too low" under the MBC approach. For the first sit­
uation, high involvement of the monitoring bank, the financing effect under the 
MBC is not much lower than under the EBC (recall that a = 1 for this case). In 
the second situation, low entrepreneur's quality, the incentive effect is high enough 
to compensate an eventual low financing effect. Here, the lender tries to provide 
incentives to the low-quality entrepreneur through an intensive monitoring (that 
is, y = 1). 
At the time of carrying out the comparison with the SBC, Proposition 3 es­
tablish that both contracts lead to similar results, except for the case when the 
entrepreneur is of high quality and the monitoring banks participate with a small 
share in the financing of their own monitored project. In such situation, the SBC 
is superior to the MBC. The reason is, as explained before, that each MB has 
senior rights of payment over the larger share of the credit lento This fact, which 
is not present under the SBC, diminish its incentives to monitor efficiently. 
Regarding the CBC, we have proved that this contract behaves as the EBC, but 
it entails the monitoring lender with a smaller bargaining power (!). Moreover, 
this fact makes the lender's market-structure effect even larger under the MBC­
CBC in comparison than for the EBC case. 
3.6. NORMAL CONTRACT 
Finally, and for comparative purposes, we describe one of the institutions previ­
ously described in the literature, the normal contracto This contract, defined in 
Sheard (1994b) has 2 main characteristics. First, it links the project returns to the 
specific bank's loan share, as we have done in the SBC and the CBC. Second, each 
bank decides its monitoring intensity on a non-cooperative basis. In this sense, 
as the monitoring tasks are not coordinated, we consider a competitive lender's 
market structure. This feature generates sorne redundancies and inefficiencies in 
the lenders' supervision tasks and, consequently generates a larger underinvest­
ment than under the other financial contracts. Recall that in those contracts, the 
monitoring tasks are distributed on a firm basis, assigning an exclusive monitoring 
to each of them. This feature allows to avoid the free-rider situation we found in 
a NC, where each bank tries to monitor with an intensity not higher than other 
banks' intensities.
 
There are two additional features to consider in this NC. First, the firm enjoys
 
a higher bargaining power compared to the previous cooperative contracts. Sec­
ond, there is no sharing of informational spillovers between both lenders. Both 
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features reinforce the conclusion that, under the type of game considered, a ca­
operative contract between lenders is superior to a non-cooperative arrangement. 
Consequently, our comparisons between the J..JBC and the previous cooperative 
contracts are more demanding on the J..JBC approach than Sheard's. His argu­
ment is only based on the superiority of the MBC over the non-cooperative NO 
because the MBC avoids the monitoring redundancies linked to the non-exclusive 
monitoring assignments among financial institutions. In contrast with Sheard's 
study, our argument neglects monitoring inefficiencies linked to free-rider con­
siderations. In all the contracts considered each firm is supervised by a single 
bank. As we stressed previously, we emphasize the MBC superiority, using three 
features: (i) a lower .financing exposure for the monitoring bank, (ii) a syrnmet­
ríe power between the monitoring lender and the firm and (iii) the possibility to 
obtain spillovers from involvement in different sectors. 
4. DISCUSSION AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In order to provide an empirical perspective to our analysis, we now include sorne 
data concerning the relevance of the Main-Bank relationships in the Japanese 
economy. Aoki (1994b) refer to a survey (Shukan Daiyamondo, 1987) contain­
ing data fram 110,000 companies with annual sales of over 8 million $ each, and 
with Main Bank relationships. They define this system as "consisting in a nexus 
of main bank-firm relationships, reciprocal monitoring delegation arrangements 
among main banks, and linkages between the financial authorities and the bank­
ing industry". The study made in this paper, covers the first two points, and 
shows that when we take into account agents' quality, informational spillovers, 
bargaining power and risk considerations, the MBC can be as good as, and in 
sorne cases may outperform the three most common cooperative financial rela­
tionships among banks and firms (the so-called, Exclusive Bank Contract, the 
Syndicated Bank Contract, and the Cooperative Bank Contract). 
It is important to note that the specific conditions needed to achieve these 
superior results for the MBC, are not extraordinary. Contrary to what one could 
think concerning the questionable validity of the MB system these days; we think 
it is more accurate to consider the MB as an ideal financial contract to be imple­
mented when the monitoring bank (MB) really bears the costs of a project failure, 
when the monitoring technology is good enough (to lower the value of a [m]) , and 
when the entrepreneur's quality is low (1 high). 
In order to confront our conclusions with the data, we present the following 
24 A Main Bank Approach to Financia] Contracting 
table, extracted from Aoki (1994b), containing the evolution during the 80's of 
the share the main bank holds in respect to the overall bank lending amount to 
the 991 largest Japanese firms listed in the stock market. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
13,3 13,5 13,6 13,6 14,2 14,8 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
15,3 15,6 15,7 16,1 15,8 15,0 
As we can see in the table, the MB share during the 80's has been increas­
ing over time. This result is consistent with our findings showing the increasing 
validity of this system as the monitoring technology improves; an expected out­
come as we move through time. The point is that simultaneously to this positive 
technological feature, another effect has appeared during the 90's. Effect which 
is barely suggested in the table and that moves in the other direction. This is 
the increasing MB's opportunity costs to devote resources to monitoring, once 
the conglomerate it finances has become very large. The reason is that in such 
scenario, the state becomes the real risk-bearer of a system failure. This fact does 
not provide incentives to the MBs to spend resources in an efficient monitoring. 
If the process goes ahead, as the South Korea's crisis shows, the collapse of the 
system can follow. Apart from that, an increase in the entrepreneur's quality is 
expected over time. This feature also goes in the "negative" direction. In fact, 
in Japan is seen that as firms become better, they break their links with their 
original MBs (Toyota is a clear example). 
Another aspect we neglect in our model is the treatment of financial distress. 
As Sheard (1994c) points out: "The most striking aspect 01 the Main Bank system 
is the role the main bank plays when client firms encounter financial adversity". 
There are two main issues to study in such scenario: 1/ the governance of the cor­
porate failure, and 2/ the process of asset reorganization (manager's replacement 
included). Because of the precise construction of our model, with informational 
symmetries and no-return in case of abad state of nature, there is no room to 
bail out firms ex-post. Nevertheless, if we had considered returns of an amount 
XM > O in the bad state, then, if we observe a project failure at the end of 
the first period, the continuation of the project would have been dependent on 
(1 - /1)hXM > 12 18, with 12 will be the additional funds to be provided in the 
second period to keep the project alive. Given that h is proportional to /1, the 
probability to continue the project would have been proportional to /1(1- /1), and 
_ .... _-------_._----------------------------­
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reached a maximum at ¡t = ~ . As we have previously shown, the MBC ensures 
this syrnmetric sharing between the lenders and the firmo This allows us to sug­
gest that, if possible, firm's bailout, under the MBC, will be as high as any other 
arrangement. 
Keeping this in mind, we can see that the validity of the MB arrangement, is 
even higher under short-term schemes than under long-term schemes. Under this 
approach, the disciplinary effect of the contract, combines with the commitment 
to make intensive bailouts. The following numbers, also extracted from Aoki 
(1994a), details the MB participation in the amount of short-term and long-term 
loans offered to the sample of firms mentioned earlier. The numbers confirm this 
hypothesis 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
ST 23,1 22,4 21,9 21,1 21,2 21,3 
LT 6,2 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,1 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
ST 20,9 20,4 20,0 20,3 19,5 19,5 
LT 8,0 8,6 9,1 9,6 10,3 9,5 
Furthermore, we can observe the presence of a bias towards the use of short­
term contracts, which has been the object of our analysis. 
As a final remark it is important to note that to develop a MB system as 
an optimal financial arrangement, it is necessary to improve bank's monitoring 
skills in a context of low entrepreneur's quality. We may argue that in the MB 
system, the interests of lenders and the entrepreneur are aligned to give each 
others incentives to improve their skills through time. The point is that in such a 
context, as firms' quality grows, other arrangements like the SBe can be superior 
to the MBe. Although, the formal study of the previous remark goes well beyond 
the scope of this work, and it would require a dynamic model, we have provided 
sorne clues of this important issue. To this respect, it is particularly necessary to 
understand the Main Bank System as a nexus of relationships in Aoki's words. 
We already mentioned in the introduction that the Main Bank is a typical 
institution of the Japanese financial system, although we believe a similar ap­
proach could be implemented in other bank-oriented countries. In particular, we 
are interested in the application of these ideas to the Spanish economy, and more 
specifically to an important framework: the presence of "núcleos duros" or large 
and stable shareholders in most of the large firms recent1y privatized. In both 
~----~----_._--------------------------------_. 
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cases, financial institutions play key roles in the governance of firms. 
Sorne large Spanish firms, previously state-owned, have been privatized in recent 
years and the former owner, the Government, has encouraged in many cases the 
formation of a reduced group of investors, mostly large banks, able to control the 
firmo This process has facilitated the appearance of two different small groups of 
institutions that repeat representation in several firms. Thus, institutional share 
holding in those companies was "assigned" to one group or the other.· It is in 
this context where we believe a kind of Main Bank approach could be developed: 
bank A of the group could specialize in monitoring sorne firms controlled by the 
group, while behaving as a second bank ("free-riding" in our terminology) in other 
cases where other banks of the same "núcleo duro" perform the monitoring tasks. 
The relevant point becomes to provide the lenders with incentives to monitor ef­
ficient1y. As it has been previously suggested, that the economic authority must 
signal it will not bear the costs of possible failures. In this Hne García-Cestona 
(1996) suggests, the economic authority could give the financial institutions of a 
"núcleo duro" full rights over the recently privatized firms. This will undoubtedly 
stimulate their efficient behavior. 
5. CONCLlJDING REMARKS 
Our main result is that a Main Bank Contract (MBC) proves to be, when certain 
conditions are met, the optimal financial arrangement to finance a wide 
range of projects characterized by their quality (J. This result is obtained in a 
symmetric information setting, and for projects where supervision and transfer of 
sorne knowledge is essential to achieve project success. Under this framework we 
compare the MBC with four alternative contracts; the Exclusive Bank Contract 
(EBC), the Syndicated Bank Contract (SBC), the Cooperative Bank Contract 
(CBC) and the Normal Contract (NC). In all five cases we face an u~derinvest­
ment situation with respect to an optimal solution, but the problem becomes the 
least in the MBC. The intuition behind this result is that the MBC combines, 
in an optimal way, three elements: 1/ One of the Banks (called the Main Bank, 
MB) holds all property rights assigned to financial intermediaries. 2/ Sharing the 
loan with other institutions, banks lower thei~ risk's exposure. 3/ This approach 
facilitates the acquisition of informational spillovers. 
The first feature comes as a direct consequence of our characterization of a MB: 
a financial institution with monitoring and hedging duties with respect to other 
participants, but with residual rights over the assets. These rights are important 
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in its negotiation with the firmo The second feature is linked to the existence of 
a cross-relationship among the banks that join a MBC. They hedge risks when 
they act as a main bank and enjoy a lower risk as a second bank. Finally, the 
third feature responds to the fact that lending to firms located in different markets 
may help the bank to acquire informational specificities linked to these markets. 
Information that could be used in future financial relationships, and therefore, 
have sorne value for the lender. 
The differences found in the bank's monitoring policy are eventually, what 
make one financial arrangement superior to the other. To describe such policies, 
we mention the presence of three features. The first one is the incentive effect 
through which the monitor tries to encourage the entrepreneur to implement a 
high effort. This effect is linked to the lender's bargaining power, which defines 
the lender share in the returns generated by each project. On the other hand, 
the financing effect relates to the higher monitoring willingness of the bank the 
higher its financing share of the monitored project is. This is closely connected 
with the particular structure of the lender's market. Each financial arrangement 
considered, imposes specific relations among the fund providers. 
As a final point we would like to translate our analysis to study sorne features 
of the current Spanish Banking situation. Prom our results, we can rationalize 
the policy followed by the main financial institutions ready to dismantle their 
cross-relationships with the strategic Spanish industrial groups. The question 
that arises naturally is to understand why the Spanish banks have preferred to 
reduce dramatically its participation in firms, rather than implementing a MB­
type of arrangement. In that sense, our model may provide sorne explanations. 
In particular, once the entrepreneur's quality becomes higher and the financing 
share of the monitoring bank lowers, outcomes which are expected as times goes 
through, then the optimally of the MBC will no longer be maintained. 
Many questions remain open: How does a bank collect information or sup­
port related firms to undergo financial distress? Given our model is a symmetric 
information one, we cannot address here this question. What are the risks associ­
ated with the ownership of firms' equity? Although the role of indirect financial 
intermediation has been approached in different ways, we have chosen here the 
delegated monitoring view that constitutes the main approach today. 
Concerning the limitations of our approach, we do not distinguish between 
different types of monitoring (ex-ante, interim, ex-post) and we just refer to this 
activity as a "monitoring-incentive" task. Neither we explain in detail how this 
activity translates into the improvement of the firm's success. Further, the same 
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construction of the model does not allow for possible bailouts. In our defense, we 
might say that once this possibility is included, the results should be even more 
biased in favor of the MBe option. Finally we would like to focus on the infor­
mational and incentive problems, without sacrificing risk considerations as we did 
using a risk-neutral model. This is an important issue in the analysis of different 
bank arrangements in order to lend money to a group of firms. Nevertheless, this 
has been left for future research. 
29 A Main Bank Approach to Financia] Contracting 
APPENDIX 
[TI 
The problem to maximize is: 
MaX{y,h}UFB = (}yhX - ~lh2 - ~my2 - 2 
S.t. UFB 2: O O:S y :S 1 O:S h:S 1 
The FOC leads to: 
8 FB { 1 1f () > h"J< 8 FB { 1 1f () > ~ 
8y U = O=} Y = (}hX 1f () < .!.!!.- (A1.1)· -U = O=} h = y (Al 2)8h (}yX 1f () < _1 • 
m - hX I - yX 
And the SOC requires that () > 7 =fl 
First we treat the m 2: l situation: 
When () > Xwe have two possibilities: 
If h < h* = ..!!l. < 1 =} Y = (}hX therefore as (}yX = h(}2 X2 > h (A1 2)
- (}X - m , '1 mi'· 
ensures that h = 1, which is a contradiction with h < h* :S 1, concluding that 
h 2: h* =} () 2: h"J< which leads to y = 1. But as m 2: l we can also ensure that 
() 2: y~ and by (A1.2) h = 1 
When 7 < () :S ;;, (A1.1) shows that y = (}~X and by (A1.2), we have two 
possibilities: (i) h = (}~X = (}~2 h > h (contradiction). (ii) h = 1 =} Y = ()~ 
Synthesizing, the optimal policy in this l < m situation is: 
()~ 1f fl < (}:S ;; 
and h = 1 (A1.3)y={ 1 1f (}>X 
UFB 2: Ocondition leads to the following threshold-values (}FB: 
If () :S Xthen UFB 2: O=}() 2: (}FB = flJ1 + t and to be consistent, l :S m - 4 
If () > X, UFB 2: O=}() 2: (}FB = l{2 + Hm +ln with l > m- 4 
As a final synthesis we have for II < mi : 
(}FB = { flJ1 + t 1f l:S m - 4 (AlA) 
:k{2+~(m+ln 1f l >m-4 
In the same way, (just changing l ~ m, we can see the II > mi situation 
(}FB = { .i,{2 J~(m + In J] I < m + 4 (A1.5) 
fl 1+~ 1f l2:m+4 
Finally, note that our assumption m :S 4 =} l 2: m - 4 
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The entrepreneur faces this maximization problem 19: 
E 1 2M aX{h} U nt - ¡dJyhX - "2lh 
UEnts.t. > Oand O:::; h:::; 1 (A2.1) 
Solving, we get the solution: 
h = Min{l, J-LO~y} (A2.2) 
Note that UEnt = 4[Min{1,yj ¡.t~X}]2 ~ O, and the entrepreneur's participation 
constraint is never binding. 
Going ahead, the lender tries to maximize its own utility function, UEB : 
Max{y} UEB Oy(l - J-L)(hX) - ~my2 - 2 
UEBs.t. > O, O:::; Y :::; 1 and h = h[y] (A2.3) 
The FOC lead to: 
2 2
~UEB = { y[tJ-L(1- J-L)X 0 - m] 1f y:::; ¡.tfx (A2.4)
 
ay (1- J-L)OX - my 1f y> ¡.tOX 
To define agents' policies, we differentiate three cases, according to L_1(1;¡.t) 20 
Al IL < ~ 1* ¡.t~ < O- J{\/ 2¡.tr;~¡.t) * ¡.t~X < 1 \jO ~ O 
O 1f 0<0
 
1 1f O:::;O<.j2{j
¡.tOX h={ O 1f 0<0y= (l-¡.t)(}X 1 1f O:::; O (A2 . 5) 
m 1f .j2{j::; O< (l-:)X
 
1 1f O~ (l-:)X
 
Note that y decreases from Oto .j2{j, and then increases again.
 
To determine the O-threshold-values, we have to impose U EB ~ O.
 
-2 1f 0<0 
L - lm(_I_)2 - 2 1f O:::; O< .j2o2 ¡.tOX (A2.6)2~J(1 - J-L)OXj2 - 2 1f .j2{j:::; O< (l-:)X 
(1- J-L)OX - ~m - 2 1f (l-:)X :::; O 
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To know ()E, we impose UEB ~ O, and use the fact that :OUEB [()] ~ O 
As UE [() = O] = -2 < Owe can assure that ()E > O 
UEB [() = J20] = ~ - 2 
UEB [() - m ] - 1 2 
- (l-JL)X - 2m - . 
As m :::; 4, we obtain ()E ~ (l-r;:)X =:;. ()E = 2(2:-~)X 
B I 11' :::; L < mi=:;. JL~ ~ Oand .j2B < (l-r;:)X 
Following a similar reasoning as in Al, agents' policy turns out to be: 
O 11 ()<O 
1 110:::;():::;JL~ O 11 ()<O 
fl:oxy= ~x 11 JL~ < () :::; .j2B h= { 1 11 O:::;():::; JL~ (A2.7) 
(l-fl:)JX 11 V20 < () < _m_ 1 
m - (l-JL)X	 1I JL~ < () 
1 1I (l-r;:)X :::; () 
Again, we can compute UEB in a similar way as (A2.6), and the corresponding 
() E 1 b ()E _ m+4 ()E > m va ue ecomes - 2(1-JL)X as -	 (l-JL)X 
el IL ~ mi 
In this case the optimal policy is much more easier: 
o 11 ()<O 
fl:OXy={~ h={	 1 11 O:::; () < JL~ (A2.8) 
1 1I JL~:::; () 
We can compute straightforwardly ()E: 
We have two cases: 
When m < L < m+4 =:;. ()E > _1 =:;. ()E = m+4 
- - 2 - JLX 2(1-JL)X 
If m+4 < L=:;.O < ()E < _1 =:;. ()E = _l_Jm+4 L 
2 - - - JLX (l-JL)X 2 
If we joint together the previous expressions we have that: 
()E= 1/m+4M {m+4 L} (A2.9) (1 - J-L)X y 2 ax 2 ' 
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@J 
In order to carry out the comparison between the Social Optimum and the 
EBC, we are going to distinguish different situations, according the relationship 
between entrepreneur's quality and lender's one. We use expressions (AlA) and 
(A1.5) for ()FB ; and (A2.9) and (A2.1O) for ()EB, keeping in mind that /-LEB = ~ 
1/ When the lender and the entrepreneur are of similar quality (l ~ m = z), 
we obtain ()F B = l {2 + z} < ()E = l (4 + z). An underinvestment fol1ows, which 
is independent of the quality level z as ()E - ()FB = i. 
2/ Low-quality lender and high-quality entrepreneur (l « m, we model this 
case considering assuming that l ---+ m - 4) 
()FB = j, y'mJI+4 (l ~ m - 4) and ()E = mt4 (l < 4). If l ---+ m _ 4 =* ()E /()FB = 
1 + ~. Therefore we also get an underinvestment. 
3/ High-quality lender and low-quality entrepreneur (l » m): 
()FB = t-llvm + 4 (l > m + 4) and ()E = :/j-llvm + 4 (l > 4). As ()FB < ()E we 
recover the underinvestment situation. 
Final1y we can see that in situation 3/, the ratio ()E /()FB = y'2 is lower than 
in situation 2/, where ()E /()FB = 1 + ~ > y'2 for m ~ 4. The conclusion is: to 
reduce underinvestment in case of large differences in agents' quality, the agent 
who chooses first has to be of higher quality than the other. 
GJ 
The entrepreneur's optimal policy is the same as (A2.2) 
With regard to the MB problem, we have: 
Jf Yl > y~UMB = { (A4.1)Jf JL ~ Yl ~ YaYl 1
 
Jf Yl < JL
 
Jf y > p.¿x (A4.2) 
Jf Y ~ p.¿x 
auSB Where we have used that ~a = 0, and the values y (y) are defined by the ex-
m ­
pressions R[y] = 2 and R[y] = 2(1 - a). 
To be systematic let us d;fine the fol1owing scenarios. If y ~ p.¿x (y > p.¿x) we 
have three different possibilities. We cal1 S2 (S~) the situation Yl > y , SI (SD if 
y ~ Yl ~ Y and final1y So (So) when Yl < y . These last ones are not relevant, 
because lead to a zero monitoring and to a ~ero entrepreneur's effort. 
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1 ~ 
In S -"- --ª-UMB = > O Jf ()1 > -va() (A43)12->"aY1 { <O Jf()l<~*e . 
I S --ª-UMB = { > O Jf ()1 > ~ (A44)nI=> aY1 1 < O Jf ()1 < () . 
On the other hand for (SD and (S~), we have: 
In S~ => a~1 UrB = 0:(1 - J.l)()X - my => y = a(l-;p(}X (A4.5) 
In Si => a~1 urB = (1 - J.l)()X - my => y = (l-!T!(}X (A4.6) 
Therefore, within Si and S~ we obtain an interior solution for y, but within SI 
and S2, the result is a comer solution. 
Equation (A4.2), shows that for y:::; JI.~X , then L ~ 2 is required 21 (we call this 
framework F2). This is relevant, because as y increases, we obtain the following 
sequence of scenarios SI -t S2 -t S~ {i = 1,2}. This sequence varies for L :::; 2 
(F1 framework). In that case the threshold-value JI.~X that defines the Si and 
S~ is lower than the corresponding to the S2. Therefore, we get in the following 
sequentialordering: SI -t Si -t S~. 
We denote with O, the ()-value which ensures the existence of scenarios S2 and S~ 
that is, makes y < 1. This value will depend if L ~ 2. In the upper alternative 
y = (l-~)(}X V2L => O= (l-~)X V2L :::; JI.~ • In the lower case, we have y = (l-~)(}X 
and consequently O= ~ ~ JI.~. If we put both cases in a joint expression, we 
. - ~/
obtam: () = (l-Jl.)XV Max{2, L} (A4.7)
 
All the detaI1s of agents' optimal policy are available upon request. In this ap­

pendix we focus on the minimum characterization of y and h to define ()M.
 
To present a systematic exposition, we consider different regions, according to the
 
value of 0:: 
221/ I Case o: ~ a[m] 1 
We split the study in different regions sensible to the L value: 
1.1/ If L < ;: 
As y[() ~ a(l~JI.)X] = h[() ~ a(l~JI.)X > JI.~] = 1, we can compute 
U MB[() _ m ] _ 1 2 <23 O ()M > m ()M _ m+4 
- a(l-Jl.)X - 2m - - => - (l-Jl.)X => - 2X(1-Jl.) 
1.2/ If L ~ ;: 
In this case, as JI.~ ~ a(l~JI.)X' we have y = 1 v() > a(l~JI.)X but 
h = 1only for () > JI.~ . Computing UM B [() = JI.~] = L - mr; therefore 
UMB[() = JI.~]~O if L~L[m] = mt4 • This inequality, jointly with the fact that 
L[m]~~ when a ~ a[m], lead liS to consider two situations, depending on L: 
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~ :::; L :::; L[m] =} ()M 2: JL~ =} ()M = 2x(i~JL) (Where we have used y = h = 1 ) 
~ M 1 M ~ L[m] :::; L =} () :::; () :::; JLX =} () = (l-~)X V !!1:t1L (where, we have used the fact 
that h = Il~X and y = 1). Synthesizing aH the results, we get what we obtained 
under the EBC 
()M = 1 1m + 4 Max{m + 4 L} (A4.8)(l-Il)XY 2 2 ' 
2/ ICase ~a[m] :::; a < a[m] I 
This interval of a v~ues, can only be possible if 1!~/2 < m 
As T (1-~/2):::; L[m] - mt4:::; ~ for ~a[m] :::; a < a[m]' we have: 
2.1/ L < T 
As y[Re :::; () :::; o(l~JL)X] = a( (l-;::BX) 2: JL~X (Scenario S~). This ensures that 
h = 1. Using this fact we can compute: 
UMB [() = j!e] = L(l - ~) - 2 < Oif L < T=} ()M > j!e 
UMB [() = o(l~JL)X] = m(~ - ~) - 2 > Oif a < a[m]. Therefore, we can conclude: 
Re < ()M < o(l~JL)X =} UM B [()M] = O{:} ()M = (l-r;:)X J mo(1~0/2) 
2.2/ T:::; L :::; L[m] 
In this case, it is straightforward to note JL~ :::; Re . Making use of this fact: 
Y[JL~ :::; () :::; j!e] = JL~X and h = 1 . With this expression, we can compute the 
sign of UMB [() = JL~] = L - L[m] :::; O due to L:::;L[m]; therefore ()M 2: JL~ 
If we check the value UMB [() = j!e] = L(l - ~) - 22: Oif L 2: T 
The previous inequalities, leads to JL~ :::; ()M :::; j!e =} ()M = (l~X v'2t-4 
2.3/ L[m] < L 
We have to note that y[1 :::; () :::; JL~] = h[() 2: JL~] = 1. As UMB [() = JL~] = 
L - L[m] > O due to L>L[m]; then ()M < JL~ 
Gn the other hand UMB [() = 1] = ~m[~ - 1] - 2:::; Oif a 2: ~a[m] =} ()M 2: 1 
The aboye implications, lead us to 1 :::; ()M :::; JL~ =} ()M = (l-~)X JmrL 
If we put aH the results together, we obtain: 
~/ 2 JfL<_4(l-JL)X V 0(1-0/2) 2-0
 
()M = ~(_L_) Jf _4 < L < m+4 (A4.9)
(l-JL)X v'2L-4 2-0 - 2 
{ 
_l_Jm+4L Jf m+4 < L(l-JL)X 2 2 ­
~~~~~_.~_._~---------------------------_. 
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3/ ICase a < ~a[m] I 
We proceed as in the previous a-region, to differentiate three regions according 
to the values of L: 
3.1/ L	 < T 
The analysis is the same as' 2.1/ ; therefore ()M = (1-~)X Jmo(I~0/2) 
3.2/ T~ L ~ Z* =(1~0) < L[m] = mt4 (when a < ~a[m]) 
This is different to 2.2/. When a ~ ~a[m] ::::} p.~ ~ JoO, which is relevant to 
characterize agents' policies: 
y[p.~ ~ () ~ JoO] = Ti and y[Jo ~ () ~ RO] = p.~X with h = 1. Computing 
UMB [() = (j] = L(l '- a) - 2 < Oif L < Z* ::::} ()M > (j
.¡a - - -.¡a 
On the other hand, we know that UMB [() = RO] ~ Oif L~Z; therefore 
(j < ()M < fi~() ()M _ ~_L_ 
.¡a - - Va::::} - (1-p.)X .j2L-4 
3.3/ Z* < L 
We pointed in 3.2/ that Z* < L ::::} ()M ~ Jo but for ()-values lower than -Jo 
there is a discontinuity in y as we move from scenario 8~ to 82 . In particular 
- (j - l' (j
y[() ~ () < .¡a] = y[()] ~ p.OX lf () ~ .¡a' 
lí we check UM B [() ---t- (j] =24 - 2(~) 2 < O::::} ()M ---t- (j
.¡a o .¡a 
Concluding in any case that ()M = Jo 
As a final synthesis, ()M for a < o{;l becomes: 
(I!!!!;X )0(1::0/2) Jf L < 2~0 
~( L ) Jf _4 < L < _2 (A4.10)(1-p.)X	 .j.JL-4 2-0 - 1-0 
..JL Jf _2_ < L 
.¡a 1-0 ­
[§] 
At the time of carry out the comparison with the EBC, we focus on scenario 
(a[m]/2 ~ a ~ a [m]) , and scenario (a < a[m]/2). Note that for a ~ a[m]' 
expressions (A4.8) and (A2.9) ensure that ()M = ()E. 
- When a[m]/2 ~ a < a[m], the relevant cases are:
 
/ B L 4 ()M - 2.fiñ)_4_ 2.fiñ) 4 _ 2:-)(m+4)2 = ()E
a or < 2-0 ::::} - X 0(2-0) > X o [m] (2-0[m]) - X 2 
Mb/ _4_	 < L < m+4 ::::} ()M = ~( L )::::} dO > Ofor L > 4 > _4_.2-0 - 2 (1-p.)X .j2L-4 dL - - 2-0 
As ()M[L = 2~0] = ()E and d:: = O, we also can ensure ()M > ()E 
•
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- When a < ~a[m], the only case we have to analyze is L 2: 2~0 < m;H 
a/ When _1_ < L < m+4 ~ eM = 7i = :l..J m L ~ dOM > O. As eM[L = _1_] = 2-0 - 2 ~ X 20 dL - 2-0 
m+4 = eE and dO E - O we obtain eM > eE X dL - ,
 
E
b/ L > m+4 ~ eM = 7i = :l..Jm L > :l..Jm+4L = e once a < la[m]
-2 .,jQ X20 X 2 , 2 
ffiJ 
As the previous cases, we first define the entrepreneur's policy, which is the 
same as (A2.2). 
In order to define the lender's monitoring policy, we make use of the expression 
(11) and (A4.1), to obtain: 
2~ULB = { y[jaJ.L(l - J.L)B2 X - m] 11 y::; ¡J.~x (A6.1) 25 
aYl 1 a(l - J.L)eX - my 11 y> ¡J.~x 
We are going to build up the e-threshold-values, considering three regions of 
analysis depending on the value of L 26: 
1/ IL < ~ I~ ¡J.~ < 30 < ~e < o(I~¡J.)X 
In this case the optimal policy followed by each agent is: 
_1 11 7i < e< fie¡J.fJX ~ - - Va e y = o(I-¡J.)fJX 11 fie < e < m h = 1 11 e> - (A6.2)
m Va - o(I-¡J.)X{ va 
1 11 o(I~¡J.)X < e 
using this policy and the definition of ULB, we can compute the threshold eS. To 
do so, we split the analysis in three cases: 
1.1/ a 2: a[m] - ~~4: 
In this case ULB[e = o(I~¡J.)X] = m(~ - ~) - 2 ::; O . Therefore we can ensure 
eS > m ~ ULB [eS] = O leads to eS = m+4 
- o(I-¡J.)X 2(1-¡J.)X 
1.2/ or;nl ::; a < a[m] 
From 1.1/ we know that eS < o(I~¡J.)X' therefore, the next e-value to consider has 
to be eS = ~e.
 
ULB[eS = fie] <O 11 L <[ 2 where [<.!!!. for a<a = 2m
Va> > (1-0/2)' > 20 >- m+8' 
with 0[;01 < ª < a[m]. This faet leads to consider two possible situations: 
- fi~ S m S m. / 2L < 1~ Vae < e ::; o(l-¡J.)X ~ e = X(l-¡J.) V mo(I-0/2) 
- m 1 ~ S /2~ S _ ~ L
1 ::; L < 20 ~ .,jQe < e ::; Vae ~ e - (1-¡J.)X(y'2L-4) 
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1.3/ If a < ~a[m] 
In this situation U[*O] > O=} ()s = *0 (note that y = h = O if () < *0 ) 
The next framework to anaIyze is: 
2/ I !!!:... < L < '!!!:.I =} (j < _1 < {f0 < m20: - - o: ViO :- J1.X VQ - o:(l-J1.)X 
In this case the optimaI policy fol1owed by each agent is: 
1 Jf (j < () < _1ViO - - J1.X 
I ./2~ l!:!!JS.. Jf ...!L<()<_I 
y = J1.9X Jf J1.X < () :S Va() h= I Jf ..¡al < () J1.X (A6.3){ { 1 J1.X(A5.2) Jf ~O < () 
We derive ()s, using a similar analysis to the L < ;: situation. We again distin- . 
guish three regions according to the value of a: 
2.1/ a 2: a[m] 
By the same argument of 1.1/, we have that ULB [() = o:(l~J1.)X] :S O, which implies 
th t ()s - m+4a - 2X(1-J1.) 
2.2/ o:[;nl :S a < a[m] 
We know that ()s < o:(l~J1.)X' Fol1owing a similar anaIysis to 1.2/, we have shown 
for L :S T27 =} ()S 2: ~O =} ()S = x(2J1.) J0:(1!0:/2), 
Regarding to L > T, as ]a :S J1.~ differently to 1.2/, we have to compute 
U LB [() = _1] <O if L < L[m] = m+4J1.X> > -2' 
Taking into account that T< L[m] < ~ for ~a[m] :S a < a[m]: 
T< L :S L[m] =} J1.~ :S ()s < ~O =} ()s = (l$X C/2~-4) 
L[m] < L < '!!!:. =} _10< ()S < _1 =} ULB[()S] = O leads to ()s = _l_Jm+4 L 
o:..¡a J1.X (l-J1.)X 2 
2.3/ If a < ~a(m] 
This situation is identicaI to 1.3/, therefore ()s = *0 
The last step is to check for high values of L , in particular: 
3/ I~ < L I=} ~O < J1.~ This analysis, as &< J1.~ is the easiest, due to the 
simplicity of agents' optimal policies: 
O Jf () < (jJf () < (j ~ ..¡a 
..¡a ¡J.9X Jf ...!L<()<_I (A6.4)Jf (j I ..¡a - - J1.Xh={ViO-< () 
_1 < ()1 Jf J1.X 
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Again we distinguish three cases, according to the values of a : 
3.1/ a ~ a[m] => ':.: :::; L[m] :::; T 
Expression (A6.4) and the fact that ULB[O = /l~]~O if L~L[m]; leads to distin­
guish two cases: 
'!!1:. < L < L[m] => OS > _1 and ULB[OS] = Oleads to OS = m±4 
o - - /lX 2X(I-/l) 
L[m] < L => '9 < OS < _1 and OS = _1_Jm±4L 
.¡a - /lX (1-/l)X 2 
3.2/ 0r;nl :::; a < a[m] 
As we have mentioned in 2.2/ L[m] < ~ , therefore L > L[m], and ULB[/l~] > O 
implies that _1(j < OS < _1_ => OS = _1_ J m±4 L 
.¡a - - /lX (1-/l)X 2 
3.3/ a < ~a[m] 
The analysis is the same as 1.3/ and 2.3/ , concluding that OS = 30 
To summarize, we have obtained for a ~ ~a[m] the same results as for the 
MBe, that is, expressions (A4.8) and (A4.9). For a < ~a[m], differently to the 
MBC OS = '9
, .¡a 
[JJ . 
To compare OS with OM when L < 1~0' we have to note that d~OM = O for 
L :::; 2~0' and d~ OM < Ofor 2~0 < L < 1~0· Gn the other hand, d~ OS > O for 
L < _2_. As OS[_4_] = OM[_4_] => OS < OM[_4_] for L < _2_.
1-0 2-0 2-0 2-0 1-0 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 This functional form facilitates the separation of effects: the quality of the 
agents inside the firm, and the quality of the lender, in the investment policy 
followed by the lender. Furthermore, we can consider this functional form as a 
local approximation to more general forms. 
2 This value of 1 = 2 simplifies the quadratic expressions derived from the cost 
functions. 
3 We assume zero interest rate 
4 The logic under this assumption is that in the initial period, there is an 
exchange of intangibles (knowledge, know-how) that does not generate material 
assets that could be liquidated. 
5 This number 4 obtained, is a consequence of assuming 1 = 2 and to deal 
with quadratic effort cost functions. 
6 When Il - m 1> 4, effort cost differences (! Il - m 1) become higher than 
the investments needed to undertake a project. Situation with a low economic 
interest. 
7 Obviously under this EBC scenario we have that L = l, as /l = !. 
8 This m-dependent factor will also be present in the threshold values of the 
different financial arrangements considered. 
9 In fact, as it was stated in Section 2, the Main Bank lends to the firm the 
overall amount of funds 1, and borrows from the other bank (1 - 0'.)1 . 
10 MBi denotes the MB for project i, and MB_i is the MB for the project 
which is not i (i = 1,2). Maintaining the same logic for second banks (SB). 
11 If we consider an additive term to account for spillovers, instead of a mul­
tiplicative factor A, all the arguments made henceforth will work in the same 
way. 
12 Similarly to the EBC, as /lMB = !' we get an expression of L = l~ , which 
is directly the l parameter that controls workers' quality. 
13 In the case of a perfect monitoring y = 1. 
14 Where _2_ < m+4 for a < a[m].
1-a 2 2 
15 This effect can be shown from equation (9), if we compute d~; < O for 
l~a ::; L < mt4 ::; 4; that is, the lower the entrepreneur's quality to-be, the lower 
the underivestement will be. 
16 We can think that monitoring tasks involve two activities: supervision and 
expertise transfer. If the entrepeneur is of high quality, the lender will reduce 
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supervision activities, focusing in the transfer of kowledge to the firmo This fact 
willlead globally to less-than-perfect monitoring actions, (y < 1). 
17 These conditions are established in Points 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 
18 Assuming the liquidation value of the project to be zero, reasonnig in the 
same way as we did in the model. 
19 In the text is motivated that p,EB = ~. To facilitate the comparison with 
the following scenarios, we maintain the general notation p,EB = P, 
20 Obviusly L = l, as we have stated that p,EB = P, = ~ 
21 As in the EBC, within this MBC scenario p,MB = P, = ~, therefore 
L = l-L = l1
-11­
22 Obviously, this situation can only be possible, when m :S 4 
23 Remember that m :S 4 
24 Where we have used h = tp,Oxy < 1 
a2 uLB 
25 SOC are satisfied, as ~ = -m < O
Yl 
26 Under this scenario, we have argued that p,OB _ P, = ~ =} L - l~ = ~ 
27 To be possible that T> ~ , then a > ª - ~~8 is required, with ~a[m] <
ª < a[m] 
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